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Abstract
We develop a novel theoretical and experimental framework to study adoption and use
of cash versus electronic payments in retail transactions. The design allows us to assess
the behavioral impact of sellers’ service fees and buyers’ rewards from using electronic
payments. In the experiment, buyers and sellers faced a coordination problem, indepen-
dently choosing a payment method before trading. Sellers readily adopted electronic
payments but buyers did not. Eliminating service fees or introducing rewards signiﬁ-
cantly increased adoption and use of electronic payments. Buyers’ economic incentives
played a pivotal role in the diﬀusion of electronic payments but cannot fully explain
their adoption choices.
Keywords: money, coordination, pricing, transactions
JEL codes: E1, E4, E5
1 Introduction
In the last decades, electronic payments have gained a signiﬁcant share of retail
transactions, eroding the usage share of cash and checks. For example, debit cards
have become the most used means of payment in one third of countries across the
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world (World Bank, 2011). Convenience and reliability are among the suggested
reasons for the growing popularity of electronic payments in retail transactions.
Yet, signiﬁcant diﬀerences in payment method adoption persist between developed
and developing regions and several surveys show that cash enjoys a wide use also
in developed economies.1
The open issue—and the objective of this study—is to understand the empir-
ical determinants of the adoption of one payment method over another by con-
sumers and retailers. Developing such an understanding is especially important
for policymakers—central banks and government regulators—in assessing social
costs and beneﬁts associated with the diﬀusion of speciﬁc payment methods.2
Unfortunately the available data have two limitations. First, estimates of cash
usage are unreliable and it is diﬃcult to characterize the relationship between rel-
ative payment costs and the adoption of a payment method (Humphrey, 2010).
A second limitation is that the available data mostly come from survey answers
that are not incentivized and therefore are subject to a number of biases and
confounds. This study takes a step towards resolving such problems by construct-
ing in the laboratory a prototypical retail market in which buyers and sellers
must coordinate on using a payment method. We build on a literature that
has successfully adopted experimental methodologies to empirically analyze the
operation of market mechanisms (Smith, 1962), ﬁnancial markets (in)eﬃciency
(Noussair and Tucker, 2103), and coordination problems (Devetag and Ortmann,
2007; Arifovic et al., 2014; Arifovic and Jiang, 2014).
The primary goal of this study is to identify features of experimental markets
that facilitate coordination on electronic payments as opposed to cash payments.
We focus on the inﬂuence of service fees and rewards associated with electronic
1See for instance World Bank (2011). For the US, Klee (2008) reports that cash captures 54
percent of all transactions collected from scanner data at 99 grocery stores. Survey data from
Austria and Canada shows that more than 50 percent of all consumption purchases are paid
for with cash (Huyn et al., 2013).
2For example, Humphrey (2010) ranks the overall unit cost of various payment methods based
on US data and report that debit cards have the lowest cost while cash has the highest ($.90
versus $1.49). There can be also non-monetary considerations such as safety, convenience for
record-keeping, privacy, tax evasion and counterfeiting, etc.; for a theoretical discussion of some
of these issues see Camera (2001) and Kahn et al. (2005).
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payments because these monetary components are at the forefront of the current
debate (Board of Governors, 2011). In the experiment we manipulate the cost
that sellers sustain from executing an electronic transaction. This cost represents
the “merchant service fee” customarily paid by sellers to the service provider—
the seller’s ﬁnancial institution.3 We also manipulate the monetary beneﬁt for
buyers who use electronic payments, treating subjects with a monetary reward
from electronic purchases, which commonly takes the form of dollars, miles, or
other types of bonuses.
We construct a laboratory retail market for a homogeneous good. Before trad-
ing, buyers and sellers independently select cash or electronic payment methods,
then meet in pairs to trade. In the pair the seller acts as a monopolist, posting a
price, and then the buyer chooses a quantity. The payment methods adopted af-
fect the ability to trade and, as a result of decentralized decision-making, payment
methods’ selections might be incompatible in some trading pairs. A transaction
may fail to occur because the seller does not accept the buyer’s payment method.
The experimental design captures features that are central to the debate about
the adoption of electronic versus cash payments. Speciﬁcally, the design assumes
that cash is legal tender and that sellers cannot price discriminate based on the
buyer’s payment method. We also consider a design variation in which only sellers
make an adoption choice, while buyers are assumed to have adopted both payment
methods, and can costlessly switch between them in the middle of a transaction.
Analysis of the data suggests the existence of strong behavioral components
in the patterns of payment method adoption. First, sellers’ service fees on elec-
3Sellers pay a service fee (or discount fee) to the service provider of the electronic payment, which
generally takes the form of a percentage of amount transacted. The “interchange transaction
fee,” which is paid to the debit card issuer, makes up for the largest share of the service
fee (U.S. Government Accountability Oﬃce, 2009). The Federal Reserve System has recently
limited interchange fees for debit cards transactions to 21 cents plus 5 basis points times the
transaction value, but only if the issuer of the debit card has more than $10 billion in assets;
the average service fee is $0.43 for exempt institutions and dropped to $0.23 for non-exempt
(Board of Governors, 2011). Credit card transactions are still exempted. Other components
of the service fee are the cost of transaction processing, terminal rental and customer service,
and the service provider’s margin. There are other fees, such as the authorization fee, paid per
authorization, communication fees, etc., but the service fee is the main one directly faced by
the merchant.
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tronic transactions inﬂuence payment methods’ adoption through an unexpected
channel: the presence of fees altered buyers’ selection of payment methods signif-
icantly more than sellers’. Sellers readily adopted electronic payments and passed
on to buyers the anticipated service fees, as theory predicts. Yet, a signiﬁcant
proportion of buyers selected cash payments. This miscoordination on payment
methods was the source of trade frictions and, consequently, ineﬃciencies. This
result is robust: when we endowed buyers with both payment methods, they still
remained reluctant to pay electronically. A possible interpretation is that buyers
hoped to induce sellers to post lower prices by revealing their readiness to pay
cash. Second, the experimental data reveal that buyers’ rewards from electronic
purchases had a signiﬁcant impact on their choice to pay electronically, and was
eﬀective at enhancing the diﬀusion of electronic payments in the market. The data
also allow us to assess the eﬃciency loss generated by mismatch in adoption of
payment systems, which we ﬁnd to increase with the frequency of cash payments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature
on retail payments. Section 3 presents the experimental design and Section 4
illustrates the theoretical predictions. Section 5 reports the empirical results on
payment methods’ adoption and aggregate eﬃciency. Section 6 reports results
for the case when only sellers have to make an adoption choice, which serve as a
robustness check. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
There is a vast literature on payment systems. Here, we focus on empirical studies
that document how consumers’ characteristics and payment methods attributes
aﬀect the diﬀusion and use of electronic payments relative to cash.
There is evidence that cash is still predominantly used in low-value transac-
tions. The literature reports a signiﬁcant correlation between consumers socio-
demographic characteristics and the payment method adopted; for example, see
Arango et al. (2015) for recent Canadian survey data. Field evidence also sug-
gests that acceptability at the point of sale and monetary incentives are rele-
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vant variables. For instance, the study of Austrian and Canadian consumers
in Huyn et al. (2013) has documented that acceptability is central to payment
method frequency of use. Arango et al. (2015), Ching and Hayashi (2010), and
Simon et al. (2010) report that monetary incentives such as buyer rewards and
loyalty programs are signiﬁcantly associated with payment choices. Another im-
portant consideration that emerges from ﬁeld studies is the importance of the
relative cost of use of payment methods for their adoption. Borzekowski et al.
(2008) document this aspect for consumers, by looking at survey data. In addi-
tion, Humphrey et al. (2001) document the existence of a signiﬁcant sensitivity
to relative costs by looking at aggregate-level ﬁeld data from Norway. There is
also evidence that price discrimination plays a role: Bolt et al. (2010) consider
survey data from the Netherlands where retailers can price discriminate depend-
ing on the payment method used and found that surcharges favor cash over card
payments. Finally, some researchers have suggested that a possible reason for
the under-utilization of electronic payments systems is the presence of network
externalities: Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2004) study the automated clearing-
house electronic payments system of the Federal Reserve System and report the
existence of network externalities.
3 Experimental design
This Section presents the set-up of the model and the experimental procedures,
while the theoretical predictions are contained in Section 4.4 The experiment
has three main treatments—called Baseline, No-Fee, and Reward—each of which
reproduces in the laboratory a prototypical retail market with an even number
of homogeneous buyers and sellers, in which frequency of use and acceptability
of diﬀerent payment methods are endogenous. There is an additional treatment,
called Switch, which serves as a robustness check and will be discussed in Section
4A variety of models has been proposed to study payment methods. For instance, Camera
(2001) studies competition between cash and electronic payments in a random matching model,
Freeman (1996) studies payment systems in an overlapping generations model, and Kahn et al.
(2005) study the problem of transactions’ privacy in a model with spatial separation. The
design we adopt is simple enough to be suitable for a laboratory investigation.
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6; in that treatment buyers no longer had to make an adoption choice because they
were assumed to have both payment methods at their disposal, and could switch
between methods in the middle of a transaction. Table 1 presents an overview of
the treatments.
Treatment
Baseline No-Fee Reward Switch
Parameters
Service fee for electronic, 1− ε 0.1 0 0.1 0.1
Rebate rate for electronic, r 0 0 0.05 0
Predictions and results
Prices
Theory p∗M ,max p∗E 120, 133 120, 120 120, 133 120, 133
Data pM , pE 180, 193 203, 190 192, 203 203, 221
Quantities
Theory q∗M ,min q∗E ,min qˆ∗E 2, 1.62, 1.62 2, 2, 2 2, 1.62, 1.79 2, 1.62, 1.62
Data qM , qME , qE 1.24, .97, .85 1.27, .93, 1.06 1.19, .95, .92 .99, .82, .94
Adoption of cash payments
Sellers (% of choices) 14.4 2.5 6.2 29.1
Buyers (% of choices) 55.3 13.0 28.2 —
Cash use (% of all settlements) 54.9 11.9 27.6 52.0
Sessions (dd/mm/yy)
26/01/12 24/01/12 31/01/12 22/01/15
26/01/12 24/01/12 0 2/02/12 23/01/15
12/03/13 11/03/13 13/03/12 23/01/15
12/03/13 11/03/13 13/03/12 24/01/15
N. participants 64 64 64 64
Table 1: Overview of the experiment
Notes: Prices: p∗M = equilibrium price posted by sellers who only accept cash (M stands for
manual, the word used in the experiment); p∗E = upper bound of equilibrium price posted by
sellers who accept both payment methods (E stands for electronic); pM = average price posted
by sellers who only accepted cash in the experiment; pE = average price posted by sellers who
accepted both payments in the experiment. Quantities: q∗M = equilibrium demand for buyer
who pays cash when price is p∗M ; min q∗E = equilibrium demand for buyer who pays cash when
price is p∗E ; min qˆ∗E = equilibrium demand for buyer who pays electronically when price is p∗E ;
qM = average quantity purchased from sellers who only accepted cash; qME = average quantity
purchased with cash from sellers who accepted electronic payments; qE = average quantity
purchased by buyers who paid electronically. Quantities refer to completed trades; prices are
rounded to the nearest integer. In the Switch treatment, buyers had access to both payment
methods; hence, no adoption choice is reported for them and quantities are calculated using
buyers’ preferred method of payment. Sessions were conducted at Purdue University in 2012,
and at Chapman University in 2013 and 2015.
Overview of a session. In each session, sixteen subjects are randomly divided
into two groups: eight buyers and eight sellers. Subjects interact anonymously
and play 40 trading periods always in the same role but with changing trading
partners. In each period, sellers are monopolists who can produce a non-storable
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good for buyers who are endowed with m transaction balances, called tokens.
Sellers and buyers can remain idle or trade goods for tokens. Tokens have a ﬁxed
redemption value, while the value of a good to a buyer (or, seller) depends on the
quantity consumed (or, produced).
A trading period includes six stages:
(1) Payment method choice: everyone independently selects a means to settle the
current trade, cash or electronic, i.e., how to transfer tokens from buyer to seller;
(2) Pricing: each seller chooses a unit price p ∈ [0, 400] for the good;
(3) Matching: buyer-seller pairs are randomly formed, according to a strangers
matching protocol;
(4) Demand: each buyer observes the posted price p and demands q ∈ [0, 4] goods;
(5) Payment: buyers complete the trade by transferring no less than pq tokens to
the seller;
(6) Outcome: payoﬀs are realized.
The Baseline treatment captures two key empirical characteristics of retail
payments. Sellers cannot refuse cash (called “manual payment” in the experimen-
tal instructions, see Supplementary Information). Electronic payments are more
convenient and reliable than cash payments, but are also more costly for sellers.
In the experiment all sellers must accept cash and their choice is whether to also
accept electronic payments. Buyers must select either cash or electronic payment
for the period—a design feature that decreases complexity, as buyers do not have
to make an additional portfolio choice. The choice of payment method is costless
and remains private information until the outcome stage.
When everyone has selected a payment method, each seller chooses a price
p. Then, in each round, buyer-seller matches are randomly formed with uniform
probability among all possible matches. At this point, each buyer sees the seller’s
price and is given the opportunity to demand a quantity q. Choosing q = 0
amounts to choosing not to trade. Finally, buyers must pay, after which earnings
are realized at the end of the period. The interaction is local: subjects observe only
the outcome in their pair and have no information about the economy as a whole.
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Furthermore, the interaction is anonymous: subjects cannot see the identity of the
other person in their pair (experimental ID), hence there is no scope for reputation
formation.
Payoﬀs. Subjects’ instructions (see Supplementary Information) described the
payoﬀ functions in tokens, by means of tables and charts reporting tokens’ earnings
for given amounts q ≥ 0 traded.
If there is no trade (q = 0), then the buyer’s payoﬀ corresponds to his transac-
tion balance endowment for the period, m, which is a random integer uniformly
distributed between 250 and 350 tokens. The seller’s payoﬀ corresponds to a
ﬁxed endowment A = 350, a parameter introduced to minimize diﬀerences in cash
payments for subjects with diﬀerent roles.
If there is trade (and the buyer earns no rebates), then the buyer’s payoﬀ is
m+ u(q)− pq,
where u(q) = 2θ√q is the consumption utility, pq is the expenditure and θ = 169.5.
The seller’s payoﬀ is
A+ q(εp− g)− F.
Net earnings include the gross revenue pq minus production costs and possible
service fees. Production costs have a ﬁxed component F = 15 and a variable
component gq, with g = 60. If payments are electronic, then the seller pays the
merchant service fee (1 − ε)pq, where 1 − ε is called the service fee. The service
fee is a treatment variable in the experiment (Table 1); it takes values 0.1 in
Baseline and Reward, and 0 in No-Fee where the seller’s payoﬀ is thus simply
A+ q(p− g)− F .5
Settling a trade. A trade of quantity q and price p can take place only if the
5In ﬁeld economies, sellers who accept credit or debit cards pay a Merchant Discount Rate or
Merchant Service Fee to the acquirer bank. Service fees range from a few basis points up to 3%
or more, and account for costs for electronic payment processing, settling fees, interchange fees
paid to the issuer, etc. In addition to explicit service fees, there may be implicit costs associated
with tax-avoidance, which is more easily accomplished if payments are made in cash. Given
these considerations, the 10% fee of the design—selected to better diﬀerentiate equilibrium
prices across treatments— is therefore not so much unrealistic.
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seller accepts the buyer’s method of payment, and if the buyer has transaction
balances m ≥ pq. A buyer starts the period with m transaction balances in a
cash or an electronic account (depending on the payment method chosen). Cash
payments have an explicit manual component. A buyer’s cash account displays
the transaction balances as a set of tokens of diﬀerent sizes (1, 5, 10, or 50-unit
tokens) ordered from large to small. Large-size tokens can be broken down into
smaller ones by clicking a button. To pay the amount pq, the buyer must manually
select a suitable combination of tokens with a series of mouse clicks, and then must
execute the payment by clicking a button (see Instructions). Electronic payments,
instead, are executed with a mouse click, which immediately transfers pq tokens
to the seller. Hence, electronic payments eliminate execution errors and minimize
the eﬀort and time to completion.
To induce diﬀerences in reliability and convenience of the two payment meth-
ods, subjects face a trading-time constraint. The entire trade sequence, from
Pricing to Payment (stages 2-5), must be completed within 60 seconds.6 A trad-
ing clock starts after everyone has selected their payment method and trade fails
if payments are not completed in time.
Outcomes. A transaction (or trade) succeeds if the seller accepts the buyer’s
payment method, the trade is executed on time, and with a suﬃcient transfer of
tokens. Otherwise the trade fails. At the end of each period, in the Outcome
stage, buyer and seller are informed whether trade succeeded or failed. In the
ﬁrst case, they see the quantity traded, the earnings, and the payment method
selected by their counterpart. Otherwise, they are informed about the reason for
the failure. At each point in time, subjects can see their own trading history in
the session. These rules and parameters are common knowledge.
The treatments No-Fee and Reward. Compared to the Baseline treatment,
in the No-Fee treatment the sellers’ service fee is set to zero, so ε = 1 in the seller’s
payoﬀ function. In the Reward treatment, instead, half of the seller’s service fee
6To familiarize subjects with the experiment, in periods 1-6 the time constraint was 120 seconds
and the payment method was exogenously imposed (electronic in periods 1-3, and cash in
periods 4-6).
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is rebated to the buyer. Hence, letting r = 1− ε2 denote the generic rebate rate
in the Reward and No-Fee treatments, the buyer’s payoﬀ can be written as
m+ u(q)− pq(1− r),
where the treatment variable r = 0.05 in Reward because 1− ε = 0.1, while r = 0
in No-Fee because 1− ε = 0 in which case the buyer’s payoﬀ is as in Baseline (see
Table 1).
We recruited 256 undergraduate subjects, half at Purdue University and half at
Chapman University for the three main treatments and all at Chapman Univer-
sity for the Switch treatment (Table 1). The experiment was programmed and
conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Instructions were read
aloud at the start of the experiment and left on the subjects’ desks. No eye con-
tact was possible among subjects. Average earnings were $22 per subject.7 On
average, a session lasted about 2 hours, including instruction reading, a quiz, and
ﬁnal payments.
4 Theoretical predictions
This section studies the symmetric Nash equilibria of the game for the three main
treatments, which we have described in the previous section. To do so, we move
backwards, starting with the derivation of the optimal demand schedule in a trade
match, given a price p and rebate rate r. Then, we study the optimal price posted
by sellers given a service fee 1 − ϵ. Finally, given optimal pricing and demand
schedules, the optimal payment method adoption strategy is studied.
Let µi ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that player i = b, s (b =buyer, s =seller)
selects cash payments. Hence, µs is the probability that a seller only accepts cash,
1−µs is the probability that a seller also accepts electronic payments, while 1−µb
and µb are, respectively, the probabilities that a buyer pays electronically and with
7The show up fee was $5 for all treatments at Purdue (at Chapman, $14 for No-Fee and $7 for
the other treatments) and the conversion rate was 7 cents for every 100 tokens at Purdue (at
Chapman, $0.07 for No-Fee and $0.12 for the other treatments). Following local lab standards,
Chapman students were paid more.
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cash. The following deﬁnitions will be helpful in what follows:
• Acceptability of electronic payments is the probability that a seller accepts
an electronic payment, 1− µs. Cash payments are always accepted.
• The reliability of a payment method is the probability of a successful trade
conditional on the given payment method being accepted by the seller. In the
experiment, reliability is endogenous. The (absolute) reliability of electronic
payments is denoted Re and the (absolute) reliability of cash payments is
denoted Rm. Let σ := Rm/Re be the relative reliability of cash payments.
• Trade risk for a buyer is the probability of failing to trade with a given
payment method because of acceptability or reliability problems. The trade
risk of electronic payments is µs + (1− Re)(1− µs). The trade risk of cash
payments is 1−Rm.
• Trade frictions in the economy are the expected share of failed trades out
of all possible trades, i.e., the expected failure rate of electronic transac-
tions (due to mismatch and reliability problems) and of cash transactions
(due to reliability problems). Normalizing trade frictions by the reliability
of electronic transactions when Re is close to one, trade frictions are approx-
imately8
τ := (1− µb)µs + (1− σ)µb.
In the experimental data Re is close to one, but Rm is not. Hence, theoret-
ical predictions can be derived considering electronic transactions as being ap-
proximately always reliable, implying that σ approximates the reliability of cash
payments, while 1 − σ and µs approximate the trade risk of cash and electronic
payments.
8The expected share of failed trades out of all possible trades is
τ∗ := (1− µb)µs + (1−Re)(1− µb)(1− µs) + (1−Rm)µb,
i.e., the expected failure rate of electronic transactions (ﬁrst two terms, capturing mismatch and
reliability problems) plus that of cash transactions (third term). Normalized trade frictions are
τ = τ∗Re . For Re ≈ 1—as in the experimental data (see later)—we have τ ≈ (1−µb)µs+µb(1−σ),
where σ = RmRe .
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4.1 Prices and quantities
Optimal demand is characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Optimal demand). Given a price p and a rebate parameter r, the
optimal demand of an unconstrained buyer satisﬁes
q(p; r) :=
(
θ
p
)2
× 1(1− r)2 ,
while a constrained buyer demands m/p.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the buyer’s transaction balances are insuﬃcient to satisfy her demand, m <
p × q(p; r), then the optimal quantity demanded is simply m/p. Otherwise, if
the buyer is unconstrained, she optimally demands q(p; r) goods. This quantity
decreases with the price p and increases with the rebate rate r.
The model is parameterized so that in equilibrium demand is always interior
(see Supplementary Information). The quantity demanded is unaﬀected by the
seller’s payment method because sellers cannot price-discriminate. It depends on
the buyer’s payment method if there are rewards from electronic payments. The
quantity traded, instead, depends on the payments methods of both parties.
To derive the optimal pricing schedule, recall that sellers are monopolists with
linear payoﬀs over tokens. They choose a price p to maximize expected prof-
its. A trade succeeds only if the seller accepts the buyer’s payment method and,
conditional on that, if the trade can be executed on time.
Lemma 2 (Optimal posted price). Consider the treatment parameters (ε, r)
and the endogenous probabilities (µb, σ). The proﬁt-maximizing prices for a seller
who, respectively, refuses and accepts electronic payments are
pM := 2g and pE := pM × µbσ(1− r)
2 + (1− µb)
µbσ(1− r)2 + (1− µb)ε.
Proof. See Appendix.
A seller who does not anticipate receiving electronic payments posts a price
pM , which is below the price pE posted if some electronic payments are expected,
where
pM ≤ pE ≤ pM
ε
,
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Sellers who expect some electronic payments charge premium prices to recoup
the expected service fees. The premium depends on the anticipated incidence of
electronic transactions, and therefore is bounded above (approximately) by the
service fee 1− ε; it falls in µb and converges to zero as µb → 1.9
To summarize, the design ensures that if sellers pay a service fee to receive elec-
tronic payments (Baseline), then they charge premium prices, where the premium
is roughly equal to the service fee 1−ε. If buyers earn rewards from electronic pur-
chases (Reward), then they increase their demand by a percentage roughly equal
to the service fee. If electronic payments have neither costs nor beneﬁts (No-Fee),
then prices and quantities are independent of the payment method adopted.
4.2 Payment methods’ adoption
Given optimal prices and quantities, we determine the choice of payment methods
in symmetric Nash equilibrium. In doing so, we diﬀerentiate use from adoption
of a payment method. Use refers to the payment method utilized in a successful
trade. Adoption refers to the individual choice of payment method.
Using Lemma 1, let q(p) := q(p; 0) when r = 0, hence let qE := q(pE) and
qM = q(pM) denote the (optimal) quantity demanded by a buyer who pays cash
and faces, respectively, prices pE and pM . In contrast, let
qˆE :=
q(pE)
(1− r)2
denote the quantity demanded by a buyer who pays electronically; clearly, the
buyer cannot trade with sellers posting pM , because they only accept cash. Using
a linear approximation around ε = 1, observe that qˆE/qE ≈ 1− ε when ε is small.
To summarize, all else equal, buyers demand an identical quantity unless rewards
are given for electronic payments; in that case, buyers who have selected electronic
payments demand more than other buyers.
Let µi denote the probability that any player i selects cash payments in sym-
9Due to the ﬁxed cost F , sellers trade only if their expected proﬁt is non-negative. The design
parameters ensure that equilibrium proﬁts are positive, i.e., F is below net earnings q(p; r)(εp−
g) and q(p)(p− g). See Supplementary Information.
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metric Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium payoﬀ Vbj to a buyer who pays using
method j = E,M and has m transaction balances is
VbE = m+ (1− µs)[u(qˆE)− pE(1− r)qˆE],
VbM = m+ σ {(1− µs) [u(qE)− pEqE)] + µs [u(qM)− pMqM ]}.
(1)
Sellers who, respectively, accept and refuse electronic payments have payoﬀs
VsE = A+ µbσ[qE(pE − g)− F ] + (1− µb)[qˆE(εpE − g)− F ],
VsM = A+ µbσ[qM(pM − g)− F ].
The payoﬀ-maximizing choice of payments method µ′j for player j = b, s satisﬁes
µ′j =

1 if VjM − VjE > 0
[0, 1] if VjM − VjE = 0
0 if VjM − VjE < 0.
Traders evaluate the expected relative beneﬁts of paying with cash and electroni-
cally. Everyone beneﬁts from the greater reliability of electronic payments. How-
ever, buyers and sellers face diﬀerent incentives. For buyers, electronic payments
generate rewards but may also carry the risk of being declined. The opposite is
true for sellers; accepting electronic payments resolves coordination problems in
payment methods, but using them may generate costs. This generates coordina-
tion problems.
Proposition 1 (Equilibria). Let prices and quantities satisfy Lemmas 1-2. Ev-
ery treatment supports two symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria characterized
by homogeneous adoption of a single payment method.
Proof. See Appendix.
The design ensures that in all treatments two Nash equilibria coexist, which
are characterized by the uniform adoption of one payment method. The two
pure strategy equilibria µj = 0, 1 for j = b, s coexist in each treatment (Table
1).10 These equilibria always coexist because payment method choices are strate-
10The Appendix reports the complete set of symmetric equilibria. In particular, there exists a
symmetric equilibrium in which sellers mix, while buyers adopt cash payments. This equilib-
rium is not robust to trembles as it introduces mismatch risk; hence, sellers have an incentive
to accept both payments since there is no cost from doing so.
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gic complements. If sellers refuse electronic payments, then a buyer’s dominant
action is to pay cash, hence µb = µs = 0. If every seller accepts both payment
methods, then buyers prefer electronic payments when these generate rewards or
are more reliable; otherwise, buyers are indiﬀerent. Hence, µb = µs = 1 is al-
ways a symmetric equilibrium. It follows that, in each treatment, subjects face a
coordination problem, which by design cannot be solved through communication.
Note that payment methods’ adoption choices have implications for the level
of trade frictions τ in the economy. Although cash payments are less reliable
than electronic, buyers’ adoption of cash payments is not necessarily a source of
trade frictions. In fact, an increase in buyers’ frequency of adoption of electronic
payments reduces trade frictions τ only when electronic payments have a lower
relative trading risk, µs < 1 − σ. Therefore, this design ensures an endogenous
association between relative diﬀusion of electronic payments and trade frictions.
This, and the pricing associated with diﬀerent adoption modes, has implications
for eﬃciency, as we explain next.
4.3 Eﬃciency
The economy may exhibit ineﬃciencies because of pricing distortions, which lead
to ineﬃcient quantities, and because of frictions due to failed transactions.
Consider the ﬁrst ineﬃciency, which is along the intensive margin. Let q∗
satisfy u′(q∗) = g, where q∗ :=
(
θ
g
)2
. From Lemmas 1-2, the quantities traded in
each of the two pure strategy equilibria are
q =
 qM = q
∗/4 if µb = µs = 1,
qˆE = (q∗/4)×
(
ε
1−r
)2
< qM if µb = µs = 0.
Traded quantities are ineﬃciently low when all transactions involve costly elec-
tronic payments because service fees amount to a distortionary tax. Minimum
equilibrium consumption occurs when buyers earn no rewards, r = 0. It follows
that trade surplus is the lowest when costly electronic payments are adopted,
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because
u(qˆE)− gqˆE = 3θ
2
4g ×
ε
1− r
[
1− ε4(1− r)
]
− F
<
3θ2
4g − F = u(qM)− gqM .
(2)
Now consider the extensive margin ineﬃciency. We measure aggregate eﬃ-
ciency by ex-ante social welfare W , deﬁned as the sum of payoﬀs to buyer and
seller, net of ﬁxed payments, plus un-rebated service fees, i.e.,
W := ∑
i=b,s
[µiV iM + (1− µi)V iE] + (1− µb)(1− µs)pEq(pE; r)(1− ε− r)− (A+m),
Here, service fees are not a deadweight loss because they either compensate buyers
(rewards) or some unmodeled service providers. In the expression W service fees
are net of rewards, pEq(pE; r)(1− ε− r), and are multiplied by (1− µb)(1− µs),
which is the expected frequency of electronic purchases. Substituting for V iE,V iM
we obtain
W = (1− µb)(1− µs)[u(qˆE)− gqˆE − F ] + µb(1− µs)σ[u(qE)− gqE − F ]
+ µbµsσ[u(qM)− gqM − F ].
(3)
The expression above indicates that a planner would impose the uniform adoption
of the highest-return payment method to avoid mismatch in payment preferences,
and note that
W =
 WM := σ[u(qM)− gqM − F ] if µb = µs = 1,WE := u(qˆE)− gqˆE − F if µb = µs = 0.
What payment system would the planner adopt, then?
Sellers
Cash Cash+Electronic
Buyers
Cash σ[u(qM)− gqM − F ] σ[u(qE)− gqE − F ]
Electronic 0 u(qˆE)− gqˆE − F
Table 2: Eﬃciency as a function of adoption choices
Notes: Each cell reports the ex-ante social welfare W from (3) for all combinations (µb, µs).
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Proposition 2 (Eﬃciency). Let prices and quantities satisfy Lemmas 1-2. If
the relative reliability of cash payments is
σ ≤ σ∗ := u(qˆE)− gqˆE − F
u(qM)− gqM − F ,
then social welfare W is maximized by common adoption of electronic payments.
To prove it, note that cash trades are associated with the greatest trading
eﬃciency, qˆE ≤ qM , but are unreliable—trade succeeds only with probability σ.
The planner selects electronic payments if WM ≤ WE, i.e., when cash payments
are suﬃciently unreliable. This occurs if σ ≤ σ∗ where σ∗ < 1 whenever ε < 1; see
(2). Given the design parameters we have σ∗ = .93 in Baseline and σ∗ = .96 in
Reward. It is immediate that σ∗ = 1 in No-Fee since quantities are independent
of the payment method used; coordinating on the use of electronic payments is
always optimal in this treatment since there are no price distortions. For the other
treatments, it depends on the realized value of σ.
5 Results: main treatments
This section focuses on two questions: did our experimental markets succeed in
coordinating on using a common payment method? And how did service fees and
rewards associated with electronic payments alter trade patterns and eﬃciency?
We report four main results. Results 1-3 concern the diﬀusion of the payment
methods. Result 4 reports the relationship between payment methods and trade
frictions and eﬃciency.
All analyses focus on the three main treatments and exclude the initial six
periods, where, in order to familiarize participants with the task, only one payment
method was made available. Hence, adoption refers to the individual choice of
payment method, and use refers to the payment method employed in a successful
transaction. Section 6 will subsequently discuss the robustness of the results to the
alternative design adopted in the Switch treatment—where buyers were assumed
to be able to pay with either method.
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Result 1 (Use of payment methods). There was mixed use of payment methods
in the Baseline treatment. The use of electronic payments prevailed in the No-Fee
and Reward treatments.
Tables 1 and 3 provide support for Result 1. Among all trades that are success-
fully completed, 45.1 percent were settled with an electronic payment in Baseline,
72.4 in Reward and 88.1 in No-Fee (Table 1). A Wilcoxon rank-sum test re-
veals that both the diﬀerence between Baseline and No-Fee and between Baseline
and Reward are signiﬁcant (p = 0.021 and p = 0.083 respectively, two-sided,
N1 = N2 = 4). Further support is provided by a probit regression, where the
dependent variable is the use of payment methods and takes value 1 for electronic
trades and 0 for cash trades (Table 3, Model 1). The econometric analysis shows
that introducing rewards for buyers or eliminating sellers’ service fees signiﬁcantly
raised overall use of electronic payments.
Recall that in all treatments the equilibrium where everybody trades with cash
coexists with the one where all trades are electronic. A possible interpretation of
Result 1 is that the cost associated with electronic payments serves as a coordi-
nation device for payment methods’ selection.
To shed further light on Result 1, we separately study the adoption choices of
sellers and buyers.
Result 2 (Adoption choices). In all treatments, sellers were more likely to
adopt electronic payments than buyers.
Figure 1 shows adoption rates by type of trader. Pooling all treatments, sellers
chose electronic payments in 92 percent of cases, while buyers adopted electronic
payments in 68 percent of instances; such diﬀerence is signiﬁcant according to
a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p < .001, two-sided, NB = NS = 12). Buyers were
signiﬁcantly more reluctant to adopt electronic payments than sellers in each treat-
ment (p = .043, .020, .021 in Baseline, No-Fee, and Reward, respectively; two-sided
Wilcoxon rank-sum, NB = NS = 4). This signiﬁcance is conﬁrmed by a probit re-
gression where the dependent variable is the payment method adopted by a trader
(Table 3, Model 2); the disparities in adoption rates between buyers and sellers
(Buyer role dummy) remain signiﬁcant even after controlling for treatment eﬀects.
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Dependent variable: Use Adoption
Payment method Pooled Buyers Sellers
(1=electronic, 0=cash) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
No-Fee treatment 2.831 *** 1.677 *** 2.391 *** 0.918 ***
(0.473) (0.261) (0.406) (0.301)
Reward treatment 1.507 *** 0.721 *** 1.390 *** 0.134
(0.469) (0.246) (0.395) (0.276)
Buyer role -1.346 ***
(0.208)
Period 0.025 *** 0.029 *** 0.024 *** 0.039 ***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Purdue location -0.599 -0.553 *** -0.438 -0.622 ***
(0.375) (0.207) (0.323) (0.236)
Constant -0.650 * 1.024 *** -0.683 ** 1.159 ***
(0.393) (0.240) (0.332) (0.257)
N.obs. 2986 6528 3264 3264
Log likelihood -904.833 -1698.241 -1112.420 -573.073
Table 3: Use and adoption of electronic payments
Notes: Probit regression with individual random eﬀects. The dependent variable takes value 1
if electronic payments are chosen and 0 otherwise. Model 1 studies the use of payment methods
considering only observations corresponding to buyers who successfully traded. Models 2—4
study the adoption of payment methods; model 1 pools adoption choices of sellers and buyers,
while models 3 and 4 separately consider adoption choices of buyers and sellers, respectively.
The default treatment is Baseline. The explanatory variable Buyer role equals 1 for a buyer
and 0 for a seller, while the dummy Purdue assumes value 1 for sessions carried out at Purdue
University and 0 for sessions at Chapman University. Periods 7-40 and main treatments only.
Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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(a) Sellers
(b) Buyers
Figure 1: Adoption of electronic payments
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It is surprising that buyers were reluctant to adopt electronic payments, and
sellers were not, because buyers never suﬀered a direct cost, while sellers did.
Hence, one would imagine that buyers would readily adopt the most convenient
method, while sellers might not. Instead, the opposite holds true. Introducing
buyers’ rewards from electronic purchases or eliminating sellers’ service fees boosts
the diﬀusion of electronic payments primarily because it alters buyers’ behavior.
On average, 45 percent of buyers chose electronic payments in Baseline, a rate
that increased to 72 percent if rewards were added and to 87 percent if fees were
removed. The increases relative to Baseline are signiﬁcant as shown by a probit
regression (Model 3 in Table 3) and by non-parametric tests (p = 0.021 and
p = 0.083 for No-Fee vs. Baseline and Reward vs. Baseline, respectively; two-
sided Wilcoxon rank-sum, N1 = N2 = 4). In contrast, sellers’ adoption choices are
less sensitive to changes across treatments. Average adoption rates of electronic
payments for sellers were 86, 94 and 98 percent in Baseline, Reward, and No-
Fee. The only signiﬁcant diﬀerence is between No-Fee and Baseline according to a
probit regression (Model 4 in Table 3); the magnitude of the eﬀect is also smaller
for sellers than buyers.11 This is interesting because it implies that subjects’
dollar costs and revenues from using electronic payments cannot entirely explain
adoption choices in the experiment.12
A referee noted that some of our ﬁndings may hinge on the existence of feed-
back eﬀects between the two sides of the market—some form of network external-
ity. Buyers will more readily adopt electronic payments when many sellers adopt
electronic payments, for instance. To test this hypothesis, we estimated sellers
and buyers’ decisions jointly using a bivariate probit model (see Supplementary
Information). In one model we also included lagged regressors that capture the
counterparts’ past behavior because in the experiment individuals on each side
11According to non-parametric analysis, the only signiﬁcant diﬀerence is between No-Fee and
Reward (p = 0.042, two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum, NNF = NR = 4).
12All else equal, a decrease in ε from 1 to 0.9 generates lower dollar earnings for subjects who
sell electronically, because now they are charged a service fee. The data reveal that altering
the subjects’ monetary incentives by eliminating this service fee in the No-Fee treatment does
not signiﬁcantly increase the seller’s frequency of electronic payments’ adoption relative to the
Baseline treatment. Hence, this variation in dollar earnings is not suﬃcient to signiﬁcantly
alter the subjects’ behavior.
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of the market slowly learn about behavior of the other side through personal ex-
perience. We ﬁnd support for the notion that past experience inﬂuences present
behavior, but the correlations of residuals—although positive—are insigniﬁcant,
suggesting that network externalities do not play a role.
Result 3 (Buyers’ adoption choices). Regular users of cash payments emerged
only in Baseline. Removing service fees and adding rewards greatly increased the
number of regular users of electronic payments.
Treatment
Share of buyers Baseline No-Fee Reward
Regular users
Cash payment 0.22 0.00 0.00
Electronic payment 0.06 0.44 0.22
Occasional users
1 or 2 switches 0.13 0.25 0.16
3 or more switches 0.59 0.31 0.63
Table 4: Buyers’ adoption of payment methods
Table 4 provides support for Result 3. Buyers who always adopted cash pay-
ments, which we call “regular users,” were 22 percent in Baseline and none in the
other treatments. There also exists a group of buyers who regularly adopted elec-
tronic payments; this group grew from 6 to 44 percent when the service fee was
removed. Most buyers were occasional users who switched payment systems. The
switching probability signiﬁcantly declined with experience and increased when-
ever a buyer experienced a trade failure. It made no diﬀerence whether the failed
trade involved an attempt to pay electronically or with cash.13 Such disparities
in adoption choices contributed to generate endogenous trade frictions and ineﬃ-
ciencies, as discussed below.
Result 4 (Trade frictions and eﬃciency). There is a positive association
between buyers’ adoption of cash payments, trade frictions, and eﬃciency losses.
13Evidence comes from a probit regression on individual changes in payment methods (Table
B-1 in Supplementary Information), where we controlled for buyers’ types according to their
prevalent adoption of payment methods, electronic or cash.
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Tables 5-6 provide support for Result 4. Trade frictions are measured as the
frequency of failed transaction in the economy (see Section 4). Frictions endoge-
nously emerged in every treatment and were positively associated with the diﬀu-
sion of cash payments in the experimental retail markets. The highest incidence of
trade frictions is found in Baseline, followed by Reward, and No-Fee (Jonckheere-
Terpstra test; p-value= 0.012, N=12, two-sided). Tobit regressions show a posi-
tive, signiﬁcant association between trade frictions and buyers’ adoption of cash
payments also after controlling for treatments eﬀects (Table 5).
Dependent variable:
Share of buyers who
adopted cash Model 1 Model 2
Trade frictions 0.257 *** 0.253 ***
(0.064) (0.063)
No-Fee treatment -0.436 ***
(0.089)
Reward treatment -0.273 ***
(0.089)
Purdue location 0.135 *
(0.073)
Constant 0.288 *** 0.457 ***
(0.067) (0.073)
N.obs. 408 408
Log. Likelihood 151.347 158.555
Table 5: Buyers’ adoption of cash payments
Notes: Tobit regressions with session random eﬀects, censored at 0. The dependent variable
is the share of buyers who chose cash payments in each period of each treatment. The unit of
observation is the period average within a session. Trade frictions are per-period session averages.
Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Buyers were pivotal in determining the diﬀusion of payment methods in our
experimental retail markets, and trade frictions largely depended on their adoption
choices. The data allow us to separately measure trade frictions that are due to
reliability problems and to acceptability problems (Table 6). Buyers who adopted
cash payments were exposed to trade risk that was entirely due to reliability
issues because by design cash was always accepted. On the other hand, buyers
who adopted electronic payments, were primarily exposed to trade risk due to
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acceptability issues because electronic payments were very reliable.
In the experiment, reliability and acceptability of payment methods were en-
dogenous. Cash payments had about 85 percent reliability, which means that a
buyer who intended to pay cash faced a 15 percent probability of being unable
to complete the trade. In contrast, electronic payments were very reliable (97-98
percent) but their acceptability varied between 86 and 98 percent, depending on
the treatment.14 As a result , buyers who adopted electronic payments faced a
trade risk that was between 3.9 and 10.5 percent.
Overall, the two payment methods exhibited similar trade risk in Baseline,
while electronic payments minimized trade risk when service fees were removed or
buyers’ rewards added. This suggests that relative trade risk considerations could
well be the driving force behind buyers’ adoption of payment methods.
Trade frictions, together with price and quantity distortions gave rise to sub-
stantial ineﬃciencies. Table 7 reports theoretical and realized eﬃciency measures.
The highest theoretical eﬃciency level is W = 344.13 (Equation 3) but it cannot
be achieved in every treatment. It can be achieved either when everyone adopts
cash payments that are fully reliable (µb = µs = 1 and σ = 1), or when everyone
adopts electronic payments that carry no costs for sellers (µb = µs = 0 and ϵ = 1).
We use this upper bound to normalize all values in Table 6 so that our eﬃciency
measures are reported as a fraction of the highest theoretical value.
Table 7 reports the theoretical eﬃciency for a treatment as the highest (nor-
malized) value W that is feasible in that treatment.15 According to Proposition
2, the highest feasible value implies uniform adoption of electronic payments, be-
cause in the experiment they were suﬃciently more reliable than cash payments,
σ < σ∗ (Table 6). Diﬀerences in theoretical eﬃciency across treatments were due
to price and quantity distortions from service-fees and rewards (Lemma 1 and 2).
Realized eﬃciency is the (normalized) value W observed in the experiment.
14The data reveal that cash trades failed primarily due to time constraints and not underpay-
ment, while the reverse is true for electronic trades, which primarily failed due to underpayment
and not time constraints (see also Table B-2 in Supplementary Information).
15For instance, in the Baseline treatment the theoretical highest value is W = 320.04, which is
based on p∗e = 133 and q∗e = 1.62. This value is then normalized, dividing it by 344.13.
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Treatment
Baseline No-Fee Reward
Trade frictions τ .114 .051 .091
Buyers’ choice of payment: cash
Fraction of choices µb .553 .130 .282
Trade risk .103 .154 .127
Reliability Rm .869 .846 .873
Acceptability 1 1 1
Buyers’ choice of payment: electronic
Fraction of choices 1− µb .447 .870 .718
Trade risk .105 .039 .083
Reliability Re .973 .985 .977
Acceptability .859 .976 .935
Performance of cash relative to electronic payments
Relative reliability σ .893 .859 .893
Relative acceptability 1.2 1.0 1.1
Table 6: Endogenous trade frictions: acceptability, reliability, and trade risk
Notes: Average incidence of trade failures unconditional and conditional on the buyer’s pay-
ment. Trade frictions are the incidence of failed trades as a percentage of all possible trades.
Trade risk for a buyer using payment method i = E,M is the incidence of trade failures either
due to reliability or acceptability by the seller. Reliability is the percentage of successful trades,
conditional on the payment method being accepted. Acceptability is the percentage of times the
buyer’s payment method is accepted by the seller. Reliability and acceptability measures are an
average of session averages. All numbers are rounded up to the closest decimal point.
Treatment
Normalized eﬃciency W Baseline No-Fee Reward
Theoretical 0.93 1.00 0.96
Realized 0.59 0.69 0.62
Breakdown of eﬃciency losses
a. Sub-optimal adoption 19.7% 11.5% 19.8%
b. Sub-optimal prices 37.2% 68.5% 46.8%
c. Sub-optimal consumption 43.1% 20.0% 29.7%
Table 7: Measures of aggregate eﬃciency
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The ordering of treatments in terms of their theoretical eﬃciency corresponds
to their ordering in terms of realized eﬃciency. In all treatments there are eﬃciency
losses, which range from .41 to .34 of the highest possible eﬃciency. These losses
originate from three sources: (a) sub-optimal adoption of payment methods; (b)
price departures from theoretical predictions; (c) quantities traded that diﬀer from
theoretical predictions.
The greatest source of ineﬃciency is associated with quantities and prices that
departed from equilibrium. Average prices movements across treatments are con-
sistent with the theoretical comparative statics. In particular, the mean price
posted by sellers who did not accept electronic payments was similar across treat-
ments; in the Baseline treatment this price was signiﬁcantly below the mean
price of sellers who accepted electronic payments. However, in the remaining
treatments, prices were not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the seller’s payment method
choice.16 Average price levels, instead, were higher than theoretical equilibrium
predictions (Table 1) and such pricing distortion was responsible for a signiﬁcant
eﬃciency loss because average quantities traded were below the theoretical equi-
librium quantities.
All treatments had some ineﬃciency resulting from mis-coordination in pay-
ment method adoption. Yet, the ineﬃcient adoption of payment methods ac-
counted for twice as much eﬃciency loss in the Baseline and Reward treatments
compared to the No-Fee treatment, where there was the highest adoption of elec-
tronic payments.
6 What if buyers carry cash and payment cards?
In this section we study the case where buyers are no longer constrained to carry
only one method of payment.17 In an additional treatment, called Switch, we
modify the Baseline design to facilitate coordination on use and adoption of elec-
tronic payment methods. Speciﬁcally, we assume that buyers have adopted both
payment methods and always carry in their wallets a card for electronic payments
16Statistical evidence is reported in the Supplementary Information, see Table B-3.
17We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of inquiry to us.
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as well as cash. Hence, while sellers must make an adoption choice as in the pre-
vious analysis, buyers can now switch from one method to the other at no cost,
in the middle of a transaction. We study the robustness of our results to this new
design, and in particular with respect to the eﬀect on sellers’ adoption choices and
on the use of payment methods that results in the market.
In the Switch treatment buyers no longer face acceptability risks because they
always carry a payment method that is accepted by the seller. At the start of
each trading round buyers must simply select how to initiate a payment in that
round. If they select electronic and this is refused by the seller, then the buyer
can promptly switch to pay with cash. Similarly, buyers who initiate a payment
with cash and for some reason cannot complete it before the trading clock runs
out can promptly switch to using electronic payments. In this manner, the design
allows us to diﬀerentiate the buyer’s preferred payment method—the one initially
selected—from the method that is used to settle the transaction.
Dependent variable: Use Preference Adoption
Payment method (buyers) (sellers)
(1=electronic, 0=cash) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Switch treatment 0.347 0.729 -0.911 **
(0.466) (0.470) (0.357)
Period 0.004 0.012 *** 0.008 **
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant -0.464 -0.684 ** 1.621 ***
(0.344) (0.343) (0.278)
N.obs. 1872 2176 2176
Log likelihood -782.718 -871.538 -747.520
Table 8: Choice and use of payments methods in Baseline and Switch
Notes: Probit regression with individual random eﬀects. The dependent variable takes value 1
if electronic payments are chosen (or used) and 0 otherwise. Model 1 studies the use of payment
methods considering only observations corresponding to buyers who successfully traded. Model
2 studies the buyers’ preferred payment method, i.e., the method selected to initiate a payment.
Model 3 studies adoption choices of sellers. The default treatment is Baseline; only data from
periods 7-40 in Baseline and in Switch are included. Symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Analysis of the data from the Switch treatment conﬁrms the robustness of the
results reported in Section 5. Table 8 allows us to compare choice and use of
payment methods in the Switch and Baseline treatments.
The data from successful transactions shows that the use of electronic pay-
ments in Switch was similar to Baseline (48% vs 45% of all successful trades);
this diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 1.00,
two-sided N1 = N2 = 4; Model 1 in Table 8). To understand this similarity in use
between Baseline and Switch we study buyers’ preference for a payment method
and sellers’ adoption.
Recall that buyers carried both payment methods at all times and could pay
either way in every transaction. Yet, they remained as reluctant to pay electroni-
cally as in the Baseline treatment. In the Switch treatment 59% of all transactions
were initiated with an oﬀer to pay electronically, which is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from the 45% adoption rate recorded in Baseline (see Model 2 of Table 8).18 In
fact, no buyer regularly initiated a transaction with electronic payments, while a
group of regular cash users emerged (about 12.5%), much as it happened in the
Baseline treatment. The data also reveals that when buyers could not pay using
the method initially selected—which occurred in 20% of all trades—they took ad-
vantage of the opportunity to switch to the other method (77% of all cases). The
switch was mostly to time-consuming cash payments, which probably explains
why in a few cases buyers did not even attempt a switch, but simply gave up on
the idea of trading in that round.
Imposing adoption of both payment methods for buyers changed sellers’ incen-
tives. Sellers adopted electronic payments less frequently in the Switch treatment
compared to Baseline (71%, vs 86%), a decline that is statistically signiﬁcant
(see the Switch treatment dummy variable in Model 3 of Table 8). This is an
interesting, and perhaps surprising, result: one would imagine that giving buyers’
costless access to both payment methods would foster coordination on adopting
electronic payments in the whole market. Yet, the sellers’ greater reliance on cash
18It is interesting to note that 59% is below the buyers’ adoption rate of electronic payments
observed in the No-Fee and Reward treatments, which was 87% and 72%, respectively.
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observed in the Switch treatment can be easily explained by cost-mitigation con-
siderations: now that buyers can switch to pay cash, sellers can safely decrease
their trade costs by forestalling any initial attempt at paying electronically. As a
consequence, the fraction of sellers who adopted electronic payments in the Switch
treatment was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than the fraction of buyers who initiated
a transaction with electronic payments (71% vs. 59%, respectively; p = 0.2482,
two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, N1 = N2 = 4).
Finally, we again ﬁnd a link between eﬃciency and use of cash, similarly to
what we previously found in the Baseline treatment.19 Overall, these considera-
tions conﬁrm the robustness of our Baseline results to the case when buyers can
costlessly carry both payment methods.
7 Discussion and conclusions
This study has developed a novel experimental framework to advance research and
to inform policies about payment methods adoption. There are many reasons why
the experimental methodology is useful to advance the study of retail payments.
In the lab, one can construct model economies where agents have perfect infor-
mation about the institutions under study. One can also manipulate exogenously
the variables of interest, hence uncovering the relationship between payment sys-
tems’ attributes—such as service fees or reward programs—and their diﬀusion in
the economy. Experiments grant the ability to combine data on use and cost of
payment systems, and to test theoretical predictions, also.
The laboratory platform we have developed is simple, is ﬂexible, and it cap-
tures basic features of two basic retail payment methods, cash and electronic. We
have used it to investigate the payment method’s adoption decisions of individual
consumers and retailers who are motivated by actual incentives. Our aim is to
shed light on the association between features of the economy and individual pay-
ment method’s adoption choices on the one hand, and endogenous trading frictions
19Support comes from a tobit regression, censored at 0, using Switch treatment data. We regress
the share of buyers who chose cash payments in a period on “Trade frictions” in a period; the
unit of observation is the period average within a session. The coeﬃcient is positive and highly
signiﬁcative.
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and social eﬃciency on the other hand. In this manner, we complement existing
survey-based studies about consumers and retailers’ adoption decisions.
We have constructed economies in which there always exist an equilibrium
where trade is only executed using cash, and another where all payments are elec-
tronic. Coordinating on using electronic payments maximizes social welfare. The
design captures empirically-relevant features of retail markets and, in particular,
that buyers and sellers face diﬀerent incentives. For buyers, electronic payments
generate beneﬁts but may carry the risk of being declined. The opposite is true for
sellers; accepting electronic payments reduces the risk of trade failures but using
electronic payments generates costs.
The experiment includes three main treatments—Baseline, No-Fee, and Reward—
each of which reproduces in the laboratory a prototypical retail market in which
use and acceptability of payment methods are endogenous. In the Baseline treat-
ment, sellers suﬀer a cost from executing an electronic transaction, which is pro-
portional to the revenue. Service fees are removed in No-Fee, while buyers’ rewards
are introduced in Reward. As a robustness check, we also study use and sellers’
adoption choices when buyers are assumed to have adopted both payment meth-
ods, in the Switch treatment. There are two main lessons.
First, analysis of the data suggests that buyers are pivotal in the diﬀusion
of electronic payments. Sellers readily adopted electronic payments in all of the
main treatments, and did so signiﬁcantly more than buyers. This is particularly
interesting given that in our set-up only sellers suﬀered electronic payments’ usage
costs, and could not price-discriminate based on the buyer’s choice of payment
method. When sellers had to pay a service fee, a sizeable group of buyers regularly
adopted cash payments. Buyers remained reluctant to pay electronically even
when we imposed adoption of both payment methods to buyers. This behavior was
no longer observed when service fees were removed or rewards added; under these
conditions, a new group of buyers emerged, which regularly adopted electronic
payments. The relative use of payments methods did not signiﬁcantly change
when we imposed adoption of both payment methods to buyers.
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Second, the data suggest that regulatory policies aimed at fostering competi-
tion among providers or at increasing reward programs could boost the diﬀusion of
electronic payments among consumers in retail markets. The experimental data
collected allows us to measure the endogenous extent of trade frictions, to pin
down their source, and to assess their impact in terms of eﬃciency loss for the
entire market. We ﬁnd that trade frictions, together with price and quantity dis-
tortions, gave rise to substantial ineﬃciencies. Interestingly, ineﬃcient diﬀusion
of payment methods accounted for twice as much eﬃciency loss in Baseline and
Reward, compared to the No-Fee treatment, where there was the highest adoption
of electronic payments.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
Consider an economy with a population composed of equal numbers of anonymous,
homogeneous sellers and buyers. We useM to denote cash as opposed to electronic
payments, denoted E.
At the beginning of the period the buyer receives a random amount of tokens
m ∈ [mL,mH ], with uniform pdf. These transaction balances can either be spent
to purchase goods or simply consumed. Buyers have quasilinear preferences de-
ﬁned over transaction balances and goods. If we normalize the price of tokens to
one (the numeraire), then the utility (in tokens) of a buyer who has m transaction
balances and purchases q > 0 goods at price p > 0 is
m+ u(q)− pq(1− r).
Here u(q) is the utility from consuming q gods, with u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, and u(0) = 0.
The expenditure is pq and r denotes a possible reward rate to the buyer, which can
be positive or zero. The reward is earned after the purchase has been executed—it
takes the form of a rebate—and so it is simply “consumed;” the reward cannot be
used to relax the expenditure constraint, i.e., we have pq ≤ m.
The buyer chooses q ≥ 0 to solve the problem
max[m+ u(q)− pq(1− r) + λ(m− pq)]
where λ is the Ku¨hn-Tucker multiplier on the expenditure constraint. The ﬁrst
order condition is
u′(q)− p(1− r)− λp ≤ 0.
We can thus deﬁne the buyer’s inverse demand function by
0 if u′(0) ≤ p(1− r),
q(p(1− r)) := (u′)−1(p(1− r)) if u′(0) > p(1− r) and pq ≤ m,
m
p
otherwise .
(4)
Demand depends on the price p posted by the seller, the transaction balances m,
and the rebate rate r, which may be zero or positive, depending on the treatment.
The demand does not directly depend on the payment method because the seller
cannot price-discriminate based on the payment method, and neither method gen-
erates a cost to the buyer. If demand is positive, then u(q)− pq(1− r) > 0.
We parameterize the model such that the decomposition q(p(1−r)) = k(r)q(p) ≥
q(p) holds, where k(0) = 1, k′(r) > 0, and q′(p) < 0 < q′′(p). When r = 0 we have
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q(p(1− r)) = q(p). In the experiment we assume u(q) = 2θ√q, which implies
q(p) =
(
θ
p
)2
,
q(p(1− r)) = k(r)q(p) = q(p)(1− r)2 ,
∂q(p(1− r))
∂p
= q′(p)k(r) = −2q(p)
p
k(r) < 0.
That is, for a buyer who encounters a seller posting a price p, q(p) is quantity
purchased if the buyer pays cash, and q(p(1−r)) is quantity purchased if the buyer
pays electronically and there is a proportional rebate r on electronic purchases. 2
B Proof of Lemma 2
Each seller is a monopolist who has linear preferences over tokens and chooses the
price p to maximize expected proﬁts, given expected demand. If q = q(p(1 − r))
for all m ∈ [mL,mH ], then expected demand is simply q(p(1− r)). We will work
under this conjecture because, under the parametrization selected, this is true in
equilibrium (see Supplementary Information).
A seller who accepts electronic payments must accept also cash, and cannot
price discriminate. Given that the buyer demands q goods when the price is p and
the rebate rate is r, the transaction can be completed only if the seller accepts
the buyer’s chosen payment method, and if the buyer transfers at least pq tokens
to the seller. Assume that cash transactions are settled with probability σ. If
a transaction cannot be settled, then nothing is produced. The expected proﬁt
VsE(p) of a seller who accepts electronic payments and posts price p is
VsE(p) := A+ µbσ[q(p)(p− g)− F ] + (1− µb)[k(r)q(p)(εp− g)− F ],
where µb denotes the (endogenous) probability that the buyer encountered uses
cash payments and we have used the fact that q(p(1− r)) = k(r)q(p).
The seller always receives the ﬁxed payment A, and may have earnings from
trading with the buyer. With probability 1 − µb the seller meets a buyer who
uses electronic payments; here, demand is k(r)q(p), so the seller’s proﬁts are
k(r)q(p)(εp− g)− F. With probability µb the seller meets a buyer who uses cash,
in which case demand is q(p), and expected proﬁts are σq(p)(p− g)− F.
The FOC for an interior solution is
µbσ[q′(p)(p− g) + q(p)] + (1− µb)k(r)[q′(p)(εp− g) + εq(p)] = 0.
Deﬁne
η0 := µbσ + (1− µb)k(r)ε and η1 := µbσ + (1− µb)k(r). (5)
Let pE be the proﬁt-maximizing price for a seller who accepts electronic payments;
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pE > 0 uniquely solves
q′(p) (pη0 − gη1) + q(p)η0 = 0,
so we have the identity
pE =
gη1
η0
− q(pE)
q′(pE)
where pE > g since η0 < η1 and q′ < 0.
A seller who does not accept electronic payments trades with probability µbσ,
i.e., when she meets a buyer who has adopted a cash payment method. The
expected proﬁt is
VsM(p) := A+ µbσ[q(p)(p− g)− F ].
The proﬁt-maximizing price pM uniquely satisﬁes Q′(p)(p− g) +Q(p) = 0, hence
pM = g − q(pM)
q′(pM)
.
pM is independent of µb, pM ≤ pE, and pE = pM only if µb = 1 or ε = 1 (which is
when η1 = η0). Given the optimal demand function in (4) we have
pM := 2g and pE := pM
η1
η0
. (6)
We have pM ≤ pE ≤ pM
ε
since η1
η0
falls in µb, equalling 1 when µb = 1 and
1
ε
when
µb = 0. Note that pM is invariant to µb while
∂pE
∂µb
∝ σk(r)(1− ε) < 0.
Due to the ﬁxed cost F , sellers trade only if their expected proﬁt is non-
negative for any choice of payment selected by the buyer. We choose parameters
so that sellers are never inactive, i.e., F is below then net earnings q(p)(εp − g)
and q(p)(p− g). To do so, we need to ensure that
F < q(pE)(εpE − g)
in which case F < q(pM)(pM − g). To see this, note that p = pM is the unique
maximizer of q(p)(p − g); it follows that q(pM)(pM − g) > q(pE)(pE − g) for all
pM < pE.We have q(pE)(pE − g) > q(pE)(εpE − g). So, if q(pE)(εpE − g)−F > 0,
then q(pM)(pM−g)−F > 0; notice also that this implies k(r)q(pE)(εpE−g)−F > 0
since k(r) > 0. For the parameters used in the experiment F < q(pE)(εpE − g)
holds in all symmetric equilibria (see Supplementary Information). 2
C Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 is a special case of proposition 3 which we next present and prove.
Proposition 3. Let prices and quantities satisfy Lemmas 1-2. Each treatment
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No-Fee Baseline Reward
µs = 0 x 1 0 x 1 0 x 1
0 X X X
µb = y X− X−
1 X− X−− X X−− X X−− X
Table 9: Multiplicity of equilibria
Notes: The Table reports all the possible symmetric equilibria. − indicates that the equilibrium
exists only if σ = 1 (cash and electronic payments are equally reliable). −− indicates that the
equilibrium is not robust to trembles in buyers’ choice. We let y = (0, 1), i.e., any number in
the open unit interval, and x = (1− σ(1− r), 1).
supports multiple symmetric Nash equilibria:
(µb, µs) =

(0, 0), (y, 0)⋆, (1, 0)⋆, (1, x), (1, 1) if (ε, r) = (1, 0);
(0, 0), (y, 0)⋆, (1, x), (1, 1) if (ε, r) = (.9, 0);
(0, 0), (1, x), (1, 1) if (ε, r) = (.9, .05),
for y = (0, 1), and x = (1− σ(1− r), 1). The notation ⋆ indicates the equilibrium
exists only if σ = 1.
Table 9 summarizes the possible equilibria, by treatment. Consider a sym-
metric stationary outcome. Let µi ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that a player of
type i = b, s (b =buyer, s =seller) adopts cash payments. Hence, 1 − µs is the
probability that a seller accepts both electronic and cash payments, while 1− µb
is the probability that a buyer uses the electronic payment method.
A buyer who adopts electronic payments can only make a purchase if the
seller accepts them. A buyer who adopts cash payments can buy from any seller.
Conjecturing that the buyer is unconstrained in his purchases, let
qˆE = q(pE(1− r))
denote the equilibrium quantity demanded when the price is pE and the rebate
rate is r. There is never a reward for a buyer who trades using cash, so we let
qE = q(pE) and qM = q(pM) denote the equilibrium quantity demanded, when the
price is pE and pM , respectively, and the buyer pays cash.
The payoﬀ Vbj to a buyer who has adopted payment method j = M,E and has
m transaction balances is thus
VbM = m+ σ {(1− µs) [u(qE)− pEqE)] + µs [u(qM)− pMqM ]} ,
VbE = m+ (1− µs)[u(qˆE)− pE(1− r)qˆE].
Here qj satisﬁes (4), pj satisfy (6) and σ ∈ (0, 1] denotes the probability that a
cash payments is completed in the time allocated to transact. It follows that
VbM − VbE = µsσ[u(qM)− pMqM ]− (1− µs)[u(qE)− pEqE]
( 1
1− r − σ
)
.
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The second term in the equality above follows from qˆE = k(r)q(pE) = q(pE)(1−r)2 so we
have u(qˆE) = u(qE) 11−r since u(q) =
√
q.
The choice of payment method µ′b of the generic buyer must satisfy:
µ′b =

1 if VbM − VbE > 0,
[0, 1] if VbM − VbE = 0,
0 if VbM − VbE = 0.
(7)
The buyer evaluates the diﬀerence between expected surplus earned when sellers
accept only cash µsσ[u(qM)−pMqM ] and the opportunity cost of using cash, which
is simply the expected surplus from using cash with a seller who accepts electronic
payments, (1− µs)[u(qE)− pEqE]; this terms is adjusted for the loss of the rebate
rate r and the possibility that the cash transaction is not completed, σ.
Let Vsj denote the payoﬀ to a seller who adopts payment method j = M,E.
In an outcome where buyers are not constrained in their purchases, we have
VsM = A+ µbσ[qM(pM − g)− F ],
VsE = A+ µbσ[qE(pE − g)− F ] + (1− µb)[qˆE(εpE − g)− F ], (8)
Seller j does not see the buyers’ method of payment before choosing the price pj.
Clearly, qˆE = qEk(r) =
qE
(1− r)2 , hence
VsM − VsE = µbσ{qM(pM − g)− [qE(pE − g)]}
−(1− µb)
{
qE
(1− r)2 (εpE − g)− F
}
.
The choice of payment method µ′s of the generic seller must satisfy
µ′s =

1 if VsM − VsE > 0
[0, 1] if VsM − VsE = 0
0 if VsM − VsE < 0.
(9)
Two remarks are in order. First, we choose parameters so that qE(εpE−g) > F .
This not only implies qE(1− r)2 (εpE − g) > F for all r ≥ 1 but also qE(pE − g) >
F ; that is a seller who accepts electronic payments makes positive proﬁts when
he engages either in an electronic or in a cash transaction (see Supplementary
Information). Second, when pj satisfy (6), we have:
• If µb = 0, then VsM − VsE < 0;
• If µb = 1, then VsM − VsE = 0 (because pM = pE = g), and
• If µb ∈ (0, 1), then VsM − VsE < 0 for ε < 1 suﬃciently large.
To prove the last bullet point recall that qM(pM−g) > qE(pE−g) for all pM < pE.
The price pE monotonically falls to pM as µb grows to 1, while pM is invariant to
µb. Hence, qM(pM − g) > qE(pE− g) when ε < 1 or r > 0 and the ﬁrst term of the
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expression VsM − VsE is positive for all µb ∈ (0, 1). If µb = 0, then VsM − VsE < 0;
if µb = 1, then VsM − VsE = 0. In principle we could have VsM − VsE < 0 for
0 < µb ≤ µ¯b < 1, and VsM − VsE > 0 otherwise. However, µ¯b < 1 only if ε is
suﬃciently small; otherwise, there is no µb ∈ (0, 1) that satisﬁes VsM −VsE = 0. To
see this note that for ε = 1 we have pE = pM , in which case VsM − VsE is negative
and increasing in µb. By continuity, this holds also for some ε < 1 suﬃciently
close to 1. In the experiments we set parameters such that this was always the
case. It follows that VsM − VsE < 0 for all µb < 1.
It is now a matter of algebra to verify that the existence of equilibria in Propo-
sition 3. The procedure is constructive. First, we conjecture that a given value
of µb is an equilibrium. Given this, we ﬁnd the optimal value for µ′s using (9).
Imposing symmetry, µ′s = µs, we conﬁrm whether the conjecture is correct for
some parameters by considering (7). If no parameters support the conjectured
value µb The details can be found in the Supplementary Materials. 2
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